This article comes at the perfect time, especially with the Cuban missile crisis parallel. It really makes one think. Could you expand on what you see as the primary variables that make deterrence so fragile in todays geopolitical landscape, perhaps with respect to the current US-Russia dynamic? It's a complex equation.
It seems to me that there are some striking parallels emerging between where we are heading today and the tensions in the early 1960s. The two new Russian weapons that were recently tested, a nuclear powered cruise missile and a nuclear powered drone differentiate themselves by elements such as speed, range or manoeuvrability. In my view, the key seems to be the potential to break the nexus of mutually assured destruction, like during the Cuban crisis. If something is too fast, too agile or its final destination is unknown it is much more dangerous than anything “we” have. This breeds both tactical instability and the strategic need for “us” to build something “better”
This article comes at the perfect time, especially with the Cuban missile crisis parallel. It really makes one think. Could you expand on what you see as the primary variables that make deterrence so fragile in todays geopolitical landscape, perhaps with respect to the current US-Russia dynamic? It's a complex equation.
It seems to me that there are some striking parallels emerging between where we are heading today and the tensions in the early 1960s. The two new Russian weapons that were recently tested, a nuclear powered cruise missile and a nuclear powered drone differentiate themselves by elements such as speed, range or manoeuvrability. In my view, the key seems to be the potential to break the nexus of mutually assured destruction, like during the Cuban crisis. If something is too fast, too agile or its final destination is unknown it is much more dangerous than anything “we” have. This breeds both tactical instability and the strategic need for “us” to build something “better”